Abstract. The principle of random selection and the principle of adding biased noise are new paradigms used in several recent papers for constructing lightweight RFID authentication protocols. The cryptographic power of adding biased noise can be characterized by the hardness of the intensively studied Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) Problem. In analogy to this, we identify a corresponding learning problem for random selection and study its complexity. Given L secret linear functions f1, . . . , fL : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} a , RandomSelect (L, n, a) denotes the problem of learning f1, . . . , fL from values (u, f l (u)), where the secret indices l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and the inputs u ∈ {0, 1} n are randomly chosen by an oracle. We take an algebraic attack approach to design a nontrivial learning algorithm for this problem, where the running time is dominated by the time needed to solve full-rank systems of linear equations over O n L unknowns. In addition to the mathematical findings relating correctness and average running time of the suggested algorithm, we also provide an experimental assessment of our results.
Introduction
The very limited computational resources available in technical devices like RFID (radio frequency identification) tags implied an intensive search for lightweight authentication protocols in recent years. Standard block encryption functions like Triple-DES or AES seem to be not suited for such protocols largely because the amount of hardware to implement and the energy consumption to perform these operations is too high (see, e.g., [7] or [17] for more information on this topic).
This situation initiated two lines of research. The first resulted in proposals for new lightweight block encryption functions like PRESENT [4] , KATAN and KTANTAN [10] by use of which standard block cipher-based authentication protocols can be made lightweight, too. A second line, and this line we follow in the paper, is to look for new cryptographic paradigms which allow for designing new symmetric lightweight authentication protocols. The two main suggestions discussed so far in the relevant literature are the principle of random selection and the principle of adding biased noise.
The principle of adding biased noise to the output of a linear basis function underlies the HB-protocol, originally proposed by Hopper and Blum [16] and later improved to HB + by Juels and Weis [17] , as well as its variants HB # and Trusted-HB (see [13] and [6] , respectively). The protocols of the HB-family are provably secure against passive attacks with respect to the Learning Parity with Noise Conjecture but the problem to design HB-like protocols which are secure against active adversaries seems to be still unsolved (see, e.g., [14] , [20] , [12] ).
The principle of random selection underlies, e.g., the CKK-protocols of Cichoń, Klonowski, and Kuty lowski [7] as well as the F f -protocols in [3] and the Linear Protocols in [18] . It can be described as follows.
Suppose that the verifier Alice and the prover Bob run a challenge-response authentication protocol which uses a lightweight symmetric encryption operation E : {0, 1}
n ×K −→ {0, 1} m of block length n, where K denotes an appropriate key space. Suppose further that E is weak in the sense that a passive adversary can efficiently compute the secret key K ∈ K from samples of the form (u, E K (u)). This is obviously the case if E is linear.
Random selection denotes a method for compensating the weakness of E by using the following mode of operation. Instead of holding a single K ∈ K, Alice and Bob share a collection K 1 , . . . , K L of keys from K as their common secret information, where L > 1 is a small constant. Upon receiving a challenge u ∈ {0, 1} n from Alice, Bob chooses a random index l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and outputs the response y = E(u, K l ). The verification of y with respect to u can be efficiently done by computing E The main problem this paper is devoted to is to determine the level of security which can be reached by applying this principle of random selection.
Note that the protocols introduced in [7] , [3] , and [18] are based on random selection of GF (2)-linear functions. The choice of linear basis functions is motivated by the fact that they can be implemented efficiently in hardware and have desirable pseudo-random properties with respect to a wide range of important statistical tests.
It is quite obvious that, with respect to passive adversaries, the security of protocols which use random selection of linear functions can be bounded from above by the complexity of the following learning problem referred to as RandomSelect (L, n, a): Learn GF (2)-linear functions f 1 , . . . , f L : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1}
a from values (u, f l (u)), where the secret indices l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and the inputs u ∈ {0, 1} n are randomly chosen by an oracle. In order to illustrate this notion, we sketch in appendix B how an efficient learning algorithm for RandomSelect (L, n, a) can be used for attacking the linear (n, k, L) + -protocol described by Krause and Stegemann [18] .
In this paper, we present an algebraic attack approach for solving the above learning problem RandomSelect (L, n, a). The running time of our algorithm is dominated by the effort necessary to solve a full-rank system of linear equations of O(n L ) unknowns over the field GF (2 a ). Note that trivial approaches for solving RandomSelect (L, n, a) lead to a running time exponential in n.
In recent years, people from cryptography as well as from complexity and coding theory devoted much interest to the solution of learning problems around linear structures. Prominent examples in the context of lightweight cryptography are the works by Goldreich and Levin [15] , Regev [21] , and Arora and Ge [2] . But all these results are rather connected to the Learning Parity with Noise Problem. To the best of our knowledge, there are currently no nontrivial results with respect to the particular problem of learning randomly selected linear functions, which is studied in the present paper.
We are strongly convinced that the complexity of RandomSelect also defines a lower bound on the security achievable by protocols using random selection of linear functions, e.g., the improved (n, k, L)
++ -protocol in [18] . Thus, the running time of our algorithm hints at how the parameters n, k, and L should be chosen in order to achieve an acceptable level of cryptographic security. Note that choosing n = 128 and L = 8 or n = 256 and L = 4, solving RandomSelect (L, n, a) by means of our algorithm implies solving a system of around 2 28 unknowns, which should be classified as sufficiently difficult in many practical situations.
The paper is organized as follows. In sections 2, 3, and 4, our learning algorithm, which conducts an algebraic attack in the spirit of [22] , will be described in full detail. We represent the L linear basis functions as assignments A to a collection X = x l i i=1,...,n,l=1,...,L of variables taking values from the field K = GF (2 a ). We will then see that each example (u, f l (u)) induces a degree-L equation of a certain type in the X-variables, which allows for reducing the learning problem RandomSelect (L, n, a) to the problem of solving a system of degree-L equations over K. While, in general, the latter problem is known to be NP-hard, we can show an efficient way to solve this special kind of systems.
One specific problem of our approach is that, due to inherent symmetries of the degree-L equations, we can never reach a system which has full linear rank with respect to the corresponding monomials. In fact, this is the main difference between our learning algorithm and the well-known algebraic attack approaches for cryptanalyzing LFSR-based keystream generators (see, e.g., [19] , [8] , [9] , [1] ).
We circumvent this problem by identifying an appropriate set T (n, L) of basis polynomials of degree at most L which allow to express the degree-L equations as linear equations over T (n, L). The choice of T (n, L) will be justified by Theorem 2 saying that if |K| ≥ L, then the system of linear equations over T (n, L) induced by all possible examples has full rank |T (n, L)|. (Note that according to Theorem 1, this is not true if |K| < L.) Our experiments, which are presented in section 5, indicate that if |K| ≥ L, then with probability close to one, the number of examples needed to get a full rank system over T (n, L) exceeds |T (n, L)| only by a small constant factor. This implies that the effort to compute the unique weak solution t (A) = (t * (A)) t * ∈T (n,L) corresponding to the strong solution A equals the time needed to solve a system of |T (n, L)| linear equations over K.
But in contrast to the algebraic attacks in [19] , [8] , [9] , [1] , we still have to solve another nontrivial problem, namely, to compute the strong solution A, which identifies the secret functions f 1 , . . . , f L , from the unique weak solution. An efficient way to do this will complete our learning algorithm for RandomSelect (L, n, a) in section 4. Finally, we also provide an experimental evaluation of our estimates using the computer algebra system Magma [5] in section 5 and conclude this paper with a discussion of the obtained results as well as an outlook on potentially fruitful future work in section 6.
The Approach
We fix positive integers n, a, L and secret GF (2)-linear functions f 1 , . . . , f L : {0, 1} n −→ {0, 1} a . The learner seeks to deduce specifications of f 1 , . . . , f L from an oracle which outputs in each round an example (u, w) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} a in the following way. The oracle chooses independently and uniformly a random input u ∈ U {0, 1} n , then chooses secretly a random index l ∈ U [L]
x , computes w = f l (u) and outputs (u, w).
It is easy to see that RandomSelect can be efficiently solved in the case L = 1 by collecting examples u 1 , w 1 , . . . , (u m , w m ) until u 1 , . . . , u m contains a basis of GF (2) n . The expected number of iterations until the above goal is reached can be approximated by n + 1.61 (see, e.g., the appendix in [11] ).
We will now treat the case L > 1, which immediately yields a sharp rise in difficulty. First we need to introduce the notion of a pure basis. Definition 1. Let us call a set V = u 1 , w 1 , . . . , (u n , w n ) of n examples a pure basis, if u 1 , . . . , u n is a basis of GF (2) n and there exists an index l ∈ [L] such that w i = f l u i is satisfied for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Recalling our preliminary findings, we can easily infer that for m ∈ Ln+Ω (1), a set of m random examples contains such a pure basis with high probability. Moreover, note that for a given setṼ = ũ 1 ,w 1 , . . . , (ũ n ,w n ) the pure basis property can be tested efficiently. The respective strategy makes use of the fact that in case of a random example (u, w), where u = i∈Iũ i and I ⊆ [n] y , the probability p that w = i∈Iw i holds is approximately L −1 ifṼ is pure and at most (2 · L) −1 otherwise. The latter estimate is based on the trivial observation that ifṼ is not a pure basis, it contains at least one tuple ũ j ,w j , j ∈ [n], which would have to be exchanged to make the set pure. As j ∈ I holds true for half of all possible (but valid) examples, the probability that w = i∈Iw i is fulfilled althoughṼ is not pure can be bounded from above by (2 · L) −1 .
However, it seems to be nontrivial to extract a pure basis from a set of m ∈ Ln + Ω (1) examples. Exhaustive search among all subsets of size n yields We exhibit the following alternative idea for solving RandomSelect (L, n, a) for L > 1. Let e 1 , . . . , e n denote the standard basis of the GF (2)-vector space {0, 1} n and keep in mind that {0, 1} n = GF (2) n ⊆ K n , where K denotes the field GF (2 a ). For all i = 1, . . . , n and l = 1, . . . , L let us denote by x l i a variable over K representing f l e i . Analogously, let A denote the (n × L)-matrix with coefficients in K completely defined by A i,l = f l e i . Henceforth, we will refer to A as a strong solution of our learning problem, thereby indicating the fact that its coefficients fully characterize the underlying secret GF (2)-linear functions
Observing an example (u, w), where u = i∈I e i , the only thing we know is that there is some index l ∈ [L] such that w = i∈I A i,l . This is equivalent to the statement that A is a solution of the following degree-L equation in the
Note that equation (1) can be rewritten as
L = min {L, |I|}, where the basis polynomials t J,j are defined as
The corresponding monomials m g are in turn defined as
for all partial mappings g from [L] to [n], where dom (g) denotes the domain of g and im (g) denotes its image.
denote the set of all basis polynomials t J,j which may appear as part of equation (2). Moreover, we define
z Stirling's formula is an approximation for large factorials and commonly written n! ≈ √ 2πn n e n .
for integers 0 ≤ b ≤ a and write
Consequently, each set of examples V = u 1 , w 1 , . . . , (u m , w m ) yields a system of m degree-L equations in the x l i -variables, which can be written as m K-linear equations in the t J,j -variables. In particular, the strong solution A ∈ K n×L satisfies the relation
where
Note that in section 3, we will treat the special structure of M (V) in further detail. Independently, it is a basic fact from linear algebra that if M (V) has full column rank, then the linear system (4) has the unique solution t (A), which we will call the weak solution.
Our learning algorithm proceeds as follows:
(2) Compute the unique solution t (A) of system (4), i.e., the weak solution of our learning problem, by using an appropriate algorithm which solves systems of linear equations over K.
We discuss the correctness and running time of steps (1) and (2) in section 3 and an approach for step (3) in section 4.
{ Keep in mind that, unlike for the previously introduced K-variables x
is not an index but an exponent. See, e.g., equation (2) .
On Computing a Weak Solution
Let n and L be arbitrarily fixed such that 2 ≤ L ≤ n holds. Moreover, let V ⊆ {0, 1}
n ×K denote a given set of examples obtained through linear functions
. By definition, for each tuple (u, w) ∈ V, where u = i∈I e i and I ⊆ [n] denotes the unique representation of u over the standard basis e 1 , . . . , e n of {0, 1} n , the relation w = f l (u) = i∈I f l e i is bound to hold for some l ∈ [L]. We denote by K min ⊆ K the subfield of K generated by all values f l e i , where l ∈ [L] and i ∈ [n]. Note that w ∈ K min for all examples (u, w) induced by f 1 , . . . , f l . In the following, we show that our learning algorithm is precluded from succeeding if the secret linear functions f 1 , . . . , f L happen to be of a certain type or if K itself lacks in size.
are linearly dependent for any set V of examples, i.e., a unique weak solution does not exist.
Proof: Let n, K, L, and f 1 , . . . , f L be arbitrarily fixed such that 2 ≤ K min < L ≤ n holds and let V denote a corresponding set of examples. Obviously, for each tuple (u, w) ∈ V, where u = i∈I e i and I ⊆ [n], the two cases 1 ∈ I and 1 / ∈ I can be differentiated. If 1 ∈ I holds, then it follows straightforwardly from equation (2) that the coefficient with coordinates (u, w) and
As K min ⊆ K is a finite field of characteristic 2, we can apply Lagrange's theorem and straightforwardly conclude that the relation z 1 = z |K min | holds for all z ∈ K min (including 0 ∈ K min ). Hence, if 1 ∈ I holds for an example (u, w), then in the corresponding row of M (V) the two coefficients indexed by t {1},(L−1) and t {1},(L−|K min |) are always equal.
If 1 / ∈ I holds for an example (u, w), then the coefficient with coordinates (u, w) and t {1},(L−1) in M (V) as well as the coefficient with coordinates (u, w) and
Consequently, if K min < L holds, then the column of M (V) indexed by t {1},(L−1) equals the column indexed by t {1},(L−|K|) for any set V of examples, i.e., M (V) can never achieve full column rank.
Corollary 1 If K is chosen such that |K| < L, then the columns of M (V) are linearly dependent for any set V of examples, i.e., a unique weak solution does not exist.
While we are now aware of a lower bound for the size of K, it yet remains to prove that step (1) of our learning algorithm is, in fact, correct. This will be achieved by introducing the ((
n × K), which clearly corresponds to the set of all possible examples, and showing that M * has full column rank |T (n, L)| if L ≤ |K| holds. However, be careful not to misinterpret this finding, which is presented below in the form of Theorem 2. The fact that M * has full column rank |T (n, L)| by no means implies that, eventually, this will also hold for M (V) if only the corresponding set of observations V is large enough. In particular, the experimental results summarized in section 5 (see, e.g., table 1) show that there are cases in which the rank of
Still, as a counterpart of Theorem 1, the following theorem proves the possibility of existence of a unique weak solution for arbitrary parameters n and L satisfying 2 ≤ L ≤ n. In other words, choosing T (n, L) to be the set of basis polynomials does not necessarily lead to systems of linear equations which cannot be solved uniquely.
Obviously, the total number of such monomials is |Z (n)| = |K| n+1 . Let us recall the aforementioned fact that the relation z 1 = z |K| holds for all z ∈ K (including 0 ∈ K). This straightforwardly implies that each monomial in the variables z 0 , . . . , z n is (as a function from
The following lemma can be easily verified:
n × K, it holds that µ J,j (w, u) equals the coefficient in M * which has the coordinates (u, w) and t J,j .
For i = 1, . . . , |K|, we denote by k i the i-th element of the finite field K. Moreover, we suppose the convention that 0 0 = 1 in K. Let (u, w) be an example defined as above and keep in mind that we are treating the case L ≤ |K|. It should be observed that the coefficients in the corresponding equation of type (2) | It can be seen easily that for random linear functions f1, . . . , fL, the relation
n × K will always hold if L < |K| and is still very likely to hold if L = |K|.
As W and B are regular, W ⊗ B ⊗n is regular, too. This, in turn, implies that the columns of M * are linearly independent, thus proving Theorem 2.
We will see in section 4 that for |K| ∈ O dnL 4 , the strong solution can be reconstructed from the weak solution in time n O(L) with error probability at most d −1 . Furthermore, section 5 will feature an experimental assessment of the number of random (valid) observations needed until M (V) achieves full column rank |T (n, L)| for various combinations of n, L, and K (see table 2 ).
On Computing a Strong Solution from the Unique Weak Solution
Let n, K, L, and f 1 , . . . , f L be defined as before. Remember that the goal of our learning algorithm is to compute a strong solution fully characterized by the L sets
, where e i denotes the i-th element of the standard basis of GF (2) n and f l e i = x l i ∈ K. Obviously, this information can equivalently be expressed as a matrix A ∈ K n×L defined by
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, we have to solve the following problem: Compute the matrix A ∈ K n×L from the information t (A), where
is the unique weak solution determined previously. But before we lay out how (and under which conditions) a strong solution A can be found, we need to introduce the following two definitions along with an important theorem linking them:
Definition 2. Let for all vectors x ∈ K L the signature sgt (x) of x be defined as sgt (x) = (|x| k ) k∈K , where |x| k denotes the number of components of x which equal k. 
. Moreover, we denote
for all matrices A ∈ K n×L . Moreover, we denote
The concept of signatures introduced in Definition 2 and the family of simple symmetric polynomials described in Definition 3 will now be connected by the following theorem:
Proof: See appendix A.
Building on this result, we can then prove the following proposition, which is of vital importance for computing the strong solution A on the basis of the corresponding weak solution t (A):
Theorem 4 Let A ∈ K n×L and t (A) be defined as before. For each subset I ⊆ [n] of rows of A, the signature of the sum of these rows, i.e., sgt i∈I A i,· , can be computed by solely using information derived from t (A), in particular, without knowing the underlying matrix A itself.
Proof: We first observe that the s-polynomials can be written as linear combinations of the t-polynomials. Trivially, the relation t {i},j = s {i},j holds for all i ∈ [n] and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ L. Moreover, for all I ⊆ [n], |I| > 1, it holds that
Note that for all J ⊆ [n] and j, |J| ≤ j ≤ L, relation (5) implies
By an inductive argument, we obtain from relation (6) that the converse is also true, i.e., the t-polynomials can be written as linear combinations of the s-polynomials.
We have seen so far that given t (A), we are able to compute s I,j for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ L, and each subset I ⊆ [n] of rows of A. Recall from Definition 3 and let x ∈ K L be defined by x = i∈I A i,· . It can be easily seen that s I (A) = s (x) holds.
In conjunction with Theorem 3, this straightforwardly implies the validity of Theorem 4.
Naturally, it remains to assess the degree of usefulness of this information when it comes to reconstructing the strong solution A ∈ K n×L . In the following, we will prove that if K is large enough, then with high probability, A can be completely (up to column permutations) and efficiently derived from the signatures of all single rows of A and the signatures of all sums of pairs of rows of A:
Then, for a random matrix A ∈ U K n×L , the following is true with a probability of approximately at least 1 − 1 d : A can be completely reconstructed from the signatures sgt (A i,· ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and sgt (A i,· ⊕ A j,· ), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
As we have seen now that, under certain conditions, it is possible to fully reconstruct the strong solution A by solely resorting to information obtained from the weak solution t (A), we can proceed to actually describe a conceivable approach for step (3) of the learning algorithm:
We choose a constant error parameter d and an exponent a, i.e., K = GF (2 a ), in such a way that Theorem 5 can be applied. Note that L ≤ n and |K| ∈ n O(1) . In a pre-computation, we generate two databases DB 1 and DB 2 of size n O(L) . While DB 1 acts as a lookup table with regard to the one-to-one relation between s (x) and sgt (x) for all x ∈ K L , we use DB 2 to store all triples of signatures S, S ,S for which there is exactly one solution pair x, y ∈ K L fulfilling sgt (x) = S and sgt (y) = S as well as sgt (x ⊕ y) =S.
Given t (A), i.e., the previously determined weak solution, we then compute sgt (A i,· ) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and sgt (A i,· ⊕ A j,· ) for all i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, in time n O(1) by using DB 1 and relation (5), which can be found in the proof of Theorem 4. According to Theorem 5, it is now possible to reconstruct A by the help of database DB 2 with probability at least 1 − 
Experimental Results
To showcase the detailed workings of our learning algorithm as well as to evaluate its efficiency at a practical level, we created a complete implementation using the computer algebra system Magma. In case of success, it takes approximately 90 seconds on standard PC hardware (Intel i7, 2.66 GHz, with 6 GB RAM) to compute the unique strong solution on the basis of a set of 10,000 randomly generated examples for n = 10, a = 3 (i.e., K = GF (2 a )), and L = 5. Relating to this, we performed various simulations in order to assess the corresponding probabilities, which were already discussed in sections 3 and 4 from a theoretical point of view.
The experimental results summarized in table 1 clearly suggest that if |K| is only slightly larger than the number L of secret linear functions, then in all likelihood, M (V) will eventually reach full (column) rank |T (n, L)|, thus allowing for the computation of a unique weak solution. Moreover, in accordance with Corollary 1, the columns of M (V) were always linearly dependent in the case of n = 5, K = GF 2 2 and L = 5, i.e., |K| = 4 < 5 = L. A further analysis of the underlying data revealed in addition that, for arbitrary combinations of n, K, and L, the matrix M (V) never reached full column rank if at least two of the corresponding L random linear functions f 1 , . . . , f L were identical during an iteration of our experiments. Note that, on the basis of the current implementation, it was not possible to continue table 1 for larger parameter sizes because, e.g., in the case of n = 8, K = GF 2 3 and L = 7, performing as few as 100 iterations already took more than 85 minutes on the previously described computer system. Table 2 features additional statistical data with respect to the number of examples needed (in case of success) until the matrix M (V) reaches full column rank |T (n, L)|. Please note that, in contrast to the experiments underlying table 1, such examples (u, f l (u)) are generated iteratively and independently choosing random pairs u ∈ U {0, 1} n and l ∈ U [L], i.e., they are not processed in their canonical order but observed randomly (and also repeatedly) to simulate a practical passive attack. While we have seen previously that for most choices of n, K and L, the matrix M (V) is highly likely to eventually reach full column rank, the experimental results summarized in table 2, most no- Table 2 . An estimate of the number of randomly generated examples (u, f l (u)) which have to be processed (in case of success) until the matrix M (V) reaches full column rank |T (n, L)|. Given a probability p, we denote by Qp the p-quantile of the respective sample.
tably the observed p-quantiles, strongly suggest that our learning algorithm for RandomSelect (L, n, a) will also be able to efficiently construct a corresponding LES which allows for computing a unique weak solution. Table 3 . An estimate of the ratio of sgt (2)-identifiable (n × L)-matrices over K.
It remains to clear up the question, to what extent Theorem 5 reflects reality concerning the probability of a random (n × L)-matrix over K being sgt (2)-identifiable (see Definitions 5.1 and 5.2 in the proof of Theorem 5), which is necessary and sufficient for the success of step (3) of our learning algorithm. Our corresponding simulations yielded table 3, which immediately suggests that even for much smaller values of |K| than those called for in Theorem 5, a strong solution A ∈ U K n×L can be completely reconstructed from the signatures sgt (A i,· ),
In conjunction with the experimental results concerning the rank of M (V), this, in turn, implies that our learning algorithm will efficiently lead to success in the vast majority of cases.
Discussion
The running time of our learning algorithm for RandomSelect (L, n, a) is dominated by the complexity of solving a system of linear equations with |T (n, L)| unknowns. Our hardness conjecture is that this complexity also constitutes a lower bound to the complexity of RandomSelect (L, n, a) itself, which would imply acceptable cryptographic security for parameter choices like n = 128 and L = 8 or n = 256 and L = 6. The experimental results summarized in the previous section clearly support this view. Consequently, employing the principle of random selection to design new symmetric lightweight authentication protocols might result in feasible alternatives to current HB-based cryptographic schemes. A problem of independent interest is to determine the complexity of reconstructing an sgt (r)-identifiable matrix A from the signatures of all sums of at most r rows of A. Note that this problem is wedded to determining the complexity of RandomSelect (L, n, a) with respect to an active learner, who is able to receive examples (u, w) for inputs u of his choice, where w = f l (u) and l ∈ U [L] is randomly chosen by the oracle. It is easy to see that such learners can efficiently compute sgt (f 1 (u) , . . . , f L (u)) by repeatedly asking for u. As the approach for reconstructing A which was outlined in section 4 needs a data structure of size exponential in L, it would be interesting to know if there are corresponding algorithms of time and space costs polynomial in L.
From a theoretical point of view, another open problem is to determine the probability that a random (n × L)-matrix over K is sgt (r)-identifiable for some r, 2 ≤ r ≤ L. Based on the results of our computer experiments, it appears more than likely that the lower bound derived in Theorem 5 is far from being in line with reality and that identifiable matrices occur with much higher probability for fields K of significantly smaller size.
A The Proofs of Theorems 3 and 5

A.1 The Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 For all L ≥ 1 and x, x ∈ K L it holds that s (x) = s (x ) if and only if sgt (x) = sgt (x ).
Proof:
The if -direction of Theorem 3 follows directly from the definitions of sgt (x) and s (x).
We will prove the only-if -direction of Theorem 3 by induction on L. The case L = 1 is obvious. Let us fix an arbitrary L > 1 and let us suppose that the following is true for all L < L and all x, x ∈ K L : if s (x) = s (x ) then sgt (x) = sgt (x ).
the following is true:
Henceforth, for all k ∈ K, r ≥ 1 and x ∈ K r , we write k ∈ x if some component of x equals k.
Lemma 3.2 For all y, y ∈ K
L , the following is true: if s (y) = s (y ) and there is some k ∈ K with k ∈ y and k ∈ y , then sgt (y) = sgt (y ).
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Suppose, w.l.o.g., that y = (x, k) and y = (x , k), where x, x ∈ K L−1 . It suffices to prove that s (x) = s (x ) as this implies by induction hypothesis that sgt (x) = sgt (x ) and, consequently, sgt (y) = sgt (y ). We prove s (x) = s (x ) by showing via induction on j that s j (x) = s j (x ) holds for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ L. The case j = 0 follows straightforwardly from Definition 3. Let us fix some j > 0 and suppose that s r (x) = s r (x ) holds for all nonnegative integers r < j. As s j (y) = s j (y ) is satisfied, it follows from Lemma 3.1, in conjunction with the induction hypothesis, that
and, consequently, s j (x) = s j (x ) holds. Lemma 3.3 For all y, y ∈ K L , the following is true: if s (y) = s (y ) and 0 ∈ y, then sgt (y) = sgt (y ).
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Trivially, s (y) = s (y ) implies that s L (y) = s L (y ). As 0 ∈ y, it follows directly from Definition 3 that s L (y) = 0, which, in turn, implies that s L (y ) = 0 and, consequently, 0 ∈ y . The proof now follows from Lemma 3.2.
Finally, we have to consider the last remaining case of y, y ∈ K L given by
where Y (Y ) denotes the set of components of y (y ).
In order to proceed, we need the following technical definition, accompanied by two technical lemmas: Definition 3.1 For all r ≥ 1 and x ∈ K r , we denote
Lemma 3.4 For all r ≥ 1 and x ∈ K r , the following is true: S (x) = 0 if and only if 1 ∈ x.
Proof of Lemma 3.4: We prove the lemma by induction on r. The case r = 1 can be easily verified. Let us fix some r > 1 and suppose that for all q, 1 ≤ q ≤ (r − 1), and all z ∈ K q , the following is true: S (z) = 0 if and only if 1 ∈ z. Furthermore, let us fix some x ∈ K r satisfying S (x) = 0 and suppose that x = (z, k) for z ∈ K r−1 and k ∈ K. In conjunction with Lemma 3.1, this yields the following equation:
Consequently, either k = 1 or, by induction hypothesis, 1 ∈ z.
Lemma 3.5 For all r ≥ 1 and x, x ∈ K r , the following is true: if
Proof of Lemma 3.5: This follows straightforwardly from the simple fact that s j (k · x) = k j · s j (x) holds for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ r.
The finding given below will complete the proof of Theorem 3:
Lemma 3.6 For all y, y ∈ K L , the following is true: if 0 / ∈ y as well as 0 / ∈ y and the sets of components of y and y are disjoint, then s (y) = s (y ).
Proof of Lemma 3.6: Due to Lemma 3.5, we can, w.l.o.g., suppose that y L = 1. Let us denote d = y L , y = (x, 1), y = (x , d) and keep in mind that d / ∈ {0, 1}. We will prove this lemma by contradiction. Hence, let us assume that s (y) = s (y ) holds.
By applying Lemma 3.1 to the assumption, we can deduce that
holds for all j = 1, . . . , L. This implies
Analogously, we obtain
i.e.,
Iterating this, one can easily show that
holds for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ (L − 1). In conjunction with the fact that
In conjunction with Lemma 3.4, this implies that 1 ∈ d −1 · x , which, in turn, means that d ∈ x. Consequently, d ∈ y and also d ∈ y , which violates the condition that the sets of components of y and y are disjoint. Hence, the assumption s (y) = s (y ) must be false.
To conclude, Theorem 3 now follows straightforwardly from Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.6.
A.2 The Proof of Theorem 5
Then, for a random matrix A ∈ U K n×L , the following is true with a probability of approximately at least 1 − Clearly, if the matrices A and B are column-equivalent, then they are also sgt (r)-equivalent for all r, 1 ≤ r ≤ L. The converse is not necessarily true as can be seen from the following example, where A, B ∈ GF (8)
2×3 :
This crucial observation leads to the following definition:
We show Theorem 5 by proving a lower bound on the probability of a random matrix A ∈ U K n×L being sgt (2)-identifiable. In order to do so, we will now introduce a sufficient condition for the sgt (2)-identifiability of an (n × L)-matrix over K and further show that with high probability, it is fulfilled if |K| is large enough.
Definition 5.3 a) For all L ≥ 1 and vectors x ∈ K L , we denote by {x} the set of all k ∈ K occurring in x, i.e., {x} = {k ∈ K | |x| k > 0}. b) For all subsets M ⊆ K, we denote by ∆ (M ) the set of differences generated by M , i.e.,
In addition, we need the following technical lemma: The following lemma states a sufficient condition for the sgt (2)-identifiability of an (n × L)-matrix over K:
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Let us consider a strongly diff.disjoint matrix A ∈ K n×L and suppose that, w.l.o.g., |{A 1,· }| = L holds (i.e., the first row of A contains the maximum number L of different elements). Furthermore, let us fix some matrix B ∈ K n×L which is sgt (2)-equivalent to A. In order to prove the lemma, we have to show that A and B are column-equivalent.
As A and B are sgt (2)-equivalent, we know that sgt (A 1,· ) = sgt (B 1,· ) holds, implying the existence of some column-permutation ρ ∈ S L such that A 1,· = ρ (B 1,· ). Now let us fix some arbitrary j, 1 < j ≤ n. From sgt (A j,· ), we learn which elements occur in row B j,· and from sgt (A 1,· ⊕ A j,· ), we learn which elements occur in B 1,· ⊕ B j,· . As {B 1,· } and {B j,· } are diff.disjoint, Lemma 5.1 implies that for each element occurring in B 1,· ⊕ B j,· , there is exactly one possibility of writing it as the sum of an element from B 1,· and an element from B j,· . Moreover, these two elements have to be in the same column of B.
Due to this and the fact that all components of B 1,· are different, the positions of all elements occurring in B j,· are uniquely determined. In particular, the aforementioned column-permutation ρ not only satisfies A 1,· = ρ (B 1,· ) but also A j,· = ρ (B j,· ) for all 1 < j ≤ n. Clearly, this proves the column-equivalence of A and B, thus implying the correctness of the lemma.
Consequently, Theorem 5 can be shown by proving an appropriate lower bound on the probability of a random matrix A ∈ U K n×L being strongly diff.disjoint. Our argument will be based on the following lemma: Lemma 5.3 Given a subset M ⊆ K such that |M | = L holds and a sequence x = (x 1 , . . . , x L ) chosen randomly from K L with respect to the uniform distribution, the lower bound on the probability of {x} being diff.disjoint from M can be approximated by 1 − x ≈ e −1 . In order to obtain a sequence x ∈ K L whose set of components is diff.disjoint from M , for all i, 1 < i ≤ L, the element x i needs to be chosen in such a way that
The probability of this being fulfilled for a randomly (i.e., independently and uniformly) chosen x i can be bounded from below by . Hence, in case of a random sequence x ∈ K L , the probability of {x} being diff.disjoint from M is at least 
By applying the above-mentioned approximations, we obtain that the lower bound on the probability of {x} being diff.disjoint from M is around 
which proves the lemma. Now let A ∈ U K n×L be a random (n × L)-matrix over K. Similarly to the argument in the previous proof, we can learn that with probability around 1 − L 2 2|K| , the first row of A contains L different coefficients. In this particular case, it follows straightforwardly from Lemma 5.3 that for all j, 2 ≤ j ≤ n, the lower bound on the probability of {A 1,· } and {A j,· } being diff.disjoint can be approximated by 1 −
then due to the implication
, in conjunction with Lemmata 5.2 and 5.3, the probability that A is sgt (2)-identifiable can be bounded from below by approximately
